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Abstract: The medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth has been encouraged by the 
continuing growth of technology that can be applied to the reproductive journey. Technology 
now has the potential to fully separate reproduction from the human body with the prospect 
of ectogenesis- the gestation of a foetus outside of the human body. This paper considers the 
issues that have been caused by the general medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth and 
the impact that ectogenesis may have on these existing issues.  The medicalisation of 
pregnancy and childbirth is criticised for its impact on the relationship between doctors and 
pregnant women and the way in which doctors treat foetuses. It is argued that ectogenesis 
may cause more imbalance in the doctor and intended parent relationship and may result in 
an increased lack of clarity regarding a doctor’s duty to the foetus. This paper finds that 
extensive guidance and revised legislation will be necessary to minimise the impact of 








This article has been accepted for publication in the Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 2020 following peer review, and the Version of 
Record can be accessed online at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-106004 
 







Technical innovations have changed the landscape of reproduction in fundamental ways. 
From the ability to view a foetus in an ultrasound image to the creation of an embryo in a 
petri dish, reproductive technologies have expanded not only how we view pregnancy (quite 
literally) but also how pregnancy comes to be. Along with these new technologies is the 
increased involvement of medical professionals from pre-conception to birth. The use of 
technology and the amplified involvement of medical personnel have led to the 
medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth. This paper adopts the concept of medicalisation 
as explained by Søren Holm, in that the human activities of pregnancy and childbirth are now 
controlled by the medical profession and handled as medical conditions to be monitored and 
treated.[1] As will be shown throughout this paper, medicalisation can harm pregnant women 
by causing them to distrust their own bodily sensations, reduce their autonomy in decision 
making and increase the tension between maternal and foetal needs.  
The medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth appears to have resulted from two main 
changes in obstetric services. Firstly, obstetricians began to take over responsibility for 
normal as well as complicated births,[2] usurping the role of community midwives.[3] This 
greater presence of obstetricians also encouraged the move of pregnancy from the home to 
the hospital.[4] Secondly, the development of prenatal technologies and findings from 
neonatal research opened up new access to the foetus for obstetricians.[5] These two changes 
created two main issues in obstetric care. Firstly, changes in the exchange of information 
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between a pregnant woman and her doctor has impacted the relationship between them. 
Secondly, technology has impacted how a foetus is treated in a clinical setting. Both of these 
issues will be explored further in this paper. 
Whilst the medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth was predominantly born from 
technologies that allowed a foetus to be viewed, monitored and accessed by doctors, the 
scope of reproductive technologies has now expanded. Technologies such as in-vitro 
fertilisation, oocyte retrieval, preimplantation genetic diagnosis and mitochondrial donation, 
mean that, for some women, more of the reproductive process is taking place in medical 
settings. These assisted reproductive technologies have too been subject to criticisms of 
medicalisation, with claims that they create solutions to issues that were never previously 
deemed clinical problems.[1]  
Research focused on saving the lives of premature babies could lead to more extreme 
reproductive technology such as partial and full ectogenesis.[6] Partial ectogenesis involves 
an embryo beginning its gestation inside the womb of a woman and then, during the 
gestational period, being transferred to an artificial womb to continue its gestation. Full 
ectogenesis, on the other hand, involves an embryo being implanted directly into an artificial 
womb and completing its full gestation in this environment. This technology will go further 
than any before by separating the reproductive process from the human body and making the 
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foetus and woman two distinct entities. This paper will consider how this innovative 
technology will impact the issues raised by the medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth.i 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOCTORS AND PREGNANT WOMEN/INTENDED 
PARENTS 
Knowledge and risk 
The increased presence of obstetricians and the introduction of technology to prenatal care 
altered the management of pregnancies and in turn, the relationship between doctors and 
pregnant women. Prior to ultrasounds and prenatal tests, information regarding foetal health 
was gained from a description of bodily symptoms provided by the pregnant woman.[5] 
However, as technology has provided obstetricians with access to the foetus, the information 
exchange between doctors and pregnant women has changed. Whilst women could retain 
some authority regarding bodily symptoms, many pregnant women now seek out the 
technologies for assurance of foetal health.[7-8] They rely on obstetricians and other 
healthcare professionals to interpret and relay the results of scans and tests in order to provide 
them with knowledge of their foetus. Therefore, any authority that the pregnant woman has in 
the doctor-patient relationship is undermined by the technology, which can alienate women 
from the management of their pregnancies. With the expanded knowledge that prenatal 
technologies provide, the expertise regarding the foetus has shifted from the pregnant woman 
 
i Whilst the legal arguments in this paper are specific to a UK context, the implications of ectogenesis on the 
general issues surrounding the medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth are considered to be applicable in all 
contexts whereby technology forms a part of maternity care. 
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to the doctor, making women more dependent on doctors to confirm the status of changes 
occurring within their own bodies. 
The increased presence of obstetricians is also claimed to have resulted in more pregnancies 
being deemed as a risk and consequently pregnancy has become more monitored and 
controlled.[9] As a result, fixed medical timeframes have been applied to pregnancies, 
allowing doctors to dictate when pregnancy begins and ends.[10] These timeframes are used 
to justify further technological interventions when the medical timings are not being 
conformed to.[10] A standard pregnancy and childbirth “norm” has thus been created,[11] 
which ignores the variability of the experience for different women and has again made 
women reliant on doctors to confirm if their pregnancy is developing “normally”. Empirical 
studies have found that women feel pressured to comply with both medical and social 
expectations of accepting an induction when becoming overdue.[12] They feel they have 
little choice in the management of the prolonged pregnancy with induction assumed to be 
inevitable.[12] A study by Emily Ross further indicated that women question bodily 
sensations in the early stages of pregnancy if they do not align with medical timelines, as well 
as the experiences of family and friends.[13] Therefore women are further reliant on doctors 
as they become influenced by a medical model of pregnancy. 
The introduction of ectogenesis could exacerbate these issues and cause women and other 
intended parents to feel like they have even less authority in the doctor-patient relationship. 
In cases of partial ectogenesis, the information exchange between doctors and pregnant 
women is unlikely to be much different during human gestation. However, once the foetus is 
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transferred to an artificial womb, the woman is likely to become more reliant on the doctor 
for information regarding foetal health as she will no longer have any physical connection to 
it.  
Similarly, in cases where the foetus is fully gestated externally, there is little information that 
the woman can provide to the doctor, since her body is no longer engaged. In both full and 
partial ectogenesis, an artificial womb is likely to be a medical and technological minefield to 
lay people.ii Whilst it is expected that doctors would have more expertise in medical 
technology, the lack of understanding, in addition to no physical connection to the foetus, 
may exacerbate feelings of alienation from the reproductive process. With the balance of 
expertise shifted in this way, doctors may feel they have more authority in the relationship. 
Ectogenesis may also provide doctors with more control regarding timeframes as the 
development of the foetus will no longer be restricted by a human body. Again, more 
expertise will be placed with doctors as they become increasingly familiar with the 
development of the foetus and intended parents once again rely on their expertise.iii  
Prenatal testing 
A further issue resulting from medicalisation has been raised by Emily Jackson, who argues 
that the development of more accurate diagnostic tests have led to a trend towards routine 
 
ii The biobag used to support premature lambs required a pumpless oxygenator circuit, closed fluid circuit and 
umbilical vascular access. An understanding of the workings of an artificial womb are likely to require more 
than the average understanding of the process of human gestation. 
iii For those without access to ectogenesis, the issues surrounding the medicalisation of pregnancy may still be 
exacerbated as more knowledge is gained regarding foetal health. However, further discussion of this point is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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prenatal testing.[9] The routine nature of such testing raises concern over whether women are 
in fact consenting to the tests and if so whether they know what it is they are consenting 
to.[14] The amount of information that can be collected through prenatal tests has expanded 
and the tests themselves have become less intrusive. For example, detecting genetic or 
chromosomal conditions in a foetus through amniocentesis involved inserting a needle into 
the abdominal wall of the pregnant woman in order to extract amniotic fluid. Such a 
procedure carries a small risk of miscarriage and can be uncomfortable for the pregnant 
woman.[15] However, non-invasive prenatal testing can now detect the same conditions, and 
potentially many more,[16] in the maternal blood stream, with a blood test being taken at an 
earlier stage in the pregnancy. Whilst the discomfort is reduced for pregnant women and the 
earlier results can provide more options for women in relation to termination decisions,[16] 
there is concern that the ease of the test can result in an assumption being drawn that all 
women will consent to it.[16] This further alters the dynamics between doctors and pregnant 
women, as all women come to be treated the same as opposed to individuals with variable 
needs and desires.  
Whilst the type of testing and procedures available with ectogenesis are not yet clear, full 
ectogenesis, in particular, may eliminate some of the physical concerns regarding consent as 
a woman would not need to subject herself to treatment or tests for the sake of the foetus. 
However, if there is no longer any discomfort to a third party, and the risks are proven to be 
relatively small for the foetus, any refusal of testing from the intended parents may be harder 
to defend. They may therefore feel pressured into proceeding with recommended testing. This 
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could also apply to cases involving partial ectogenesis, as some testing may become available 
that was not possible during human gestation.  
Consent issues may also still arise when it comes to the intended parents understanding 
information being presented. Having intended parents fully understand the intricacies of an 
artificial womb and the treatment and testing options available through this technology could 
be difficult and as a result they may not understand if and what options are available. This, 
along with the potential pressure to comply, may result in intended parents, much like 
pregnant women, feeling in a weaker position to the doctors, resulting in them consenting to 
testing and procedures presented as routine.iv  
Expectations 
Technology may have further impacted the relationship between women and doctors by 
increasing the expectations of medicine. Richard Johanson et al suggest that as science 
advances, the belief that the medical profession can solve all ills or prevent all disasters 
increases.[2] As a result, they claim that the increased medicalisation of pregnancy and 
childbirth is a result of defensive practice by doctors.[2] Due to the elevated expectations of 
pregnant women, doctors may be exercising excess caution and overusing available 
technologies. Heather Cahill has further suggested that the visibility of these technologies 
 
iv There is the possibility that a different decision-making model could be applied to ectogenic foetuses, 
depending on their legal status, discussed later in the paper. Whilst the different models that may be applied are 
beyond the scope of this paper, a model that would not require parental consent would subvert the concerns 
raised regarding informed consent. I am grateful to the reviewer for raising this issue. 
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provides “proof” of the maternal and foetal care being delivered and as such both the public 
and politicians are reassured as to the use and allocation of resources.[17] 
If ectogenesis is promoted as a healthier alternative to natural gestation for some women, 
which in itself has wider political implications,[18-21] a belief that more medical difficulties 
can be overcome may be encouraged. As a result more disputes may arise between doctors 
and intended parents when it comes to treatment decisions, as parents try to insist that more 
can be done.[22] For full ectogenesis, parents may have higher expectations for the health of 
the foetus if it was presented as safer than human gestation and with partial ectogenesis, 
women may try to demand that their foetuses be transferred to an artificial womb to improve 
prognosis for identified medical conditions. The breakdown in relationship between doctors 
and families has previously been evidenced in court proceedings,[23] and a recent briefing 
note from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has indicated that a feeling of powerlessness by 
parents can contribute to the strained relationships.[25] Feelings of powerlessness may be 
exacerbated by a lack of understanding of the functioning of the artificial womb and therefore 
relationship breakdowns may increase between intended parents and healthcare professionals. 
Information provision 
The provision of information to the intended parents prior to any engagement with 
ectogenesis will be essential to limit the concerns outlined above. This may take the shape of 
preparation classes, much like antenatal classes, and if ectogenesis becomes a mainstream 
option for gestation, the function of artificial wombs may also form part of sex education 
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classes in schools.v Providing the information prior to any use of the technology reduces the 
occurrence of situations whereby intended parents need to digest complex information in a 
time-pressured and stressful situation. In order to manage expectations, discussions should 
also focus on the limitations of ectogenesis. This will be particularly pertinent for early users 
of ectogenesis, during which the limitations may still be under review.  
The next part of this paper considers the impact of medicalisation on the treatment of a foetus 
in a clinical setting and how this may be influenced by ectogenesis.  
TREATMENT OF A FOETUS 
Foetus as a second patient 
As well as a change in the relationship between doctors and pregnant women, the 
observational technologies have altered the doctor’s relationship with the foetus. The ability 
to look inside the womb has been said to have encouraged the foetus to be viewed as a 
separate entity, disassociated from the pregnant woman.[5, 26] As a result the foetus has 
come to be treated as a second patient during pregnancy and childbirth.[5] The range of foetal 
surgery that can now be carried out further encourages doctors to view themselves as 
providing treatment directly to the foetus as opposed to the pregnant woman.[5] Treating the 
foetus as a patient is also likely to be driven by a doctor’s knowledge that should they injure 
the foetus as a result of negligence and the foetus goes on to be born alive, the doctor can be 
sued for the injuries.[27] This may further account for the defensive use of prenatal 
 
v I am grateful to Dr Rita D’Alton-Harrison for both suggestions.[24] 
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technologies discussed above. This medicalisation of the status of the foetus could potentially 
be damaging to the autonomy of pregnant women, as their desires may be overshadowed by 
the needs of the foetus. 
Tensions relating to a foetus being treated as a patient by doctors are driven by the foetus’ 
position within a pregnant woman. As ectogenesis presents an opportunity for the foetus and 
woman to be separated, it may be argued that treating an externally gestated foetus as a 
patient would not be controversial.vi Any treatment provided to the foetus would not 
physically impact the woman and there would be no need to balance the foetus’ needs with 
the bodily integrity of another. It therefore appears that ectogenesis could provide a solution 
to foetal status in the medical setting as a doctor can pursue their duty of care towards the 
foetus as a patient.vii  
Legal status of the foetus 
Termination  
Despite a potential status as patient, legally a foetus is not considered a person nor is it judged 
to have any interests.[28-29] However, viability is considered to have a significant impact on 
the legal status of foetuses. In England, Wales and Scotland, aborting a foetus after 24 weeks 
gestation requires satisfying more stringent grounds under the Abortion Act 1967.[30-32] A 
woman can seek an abortion prior to the 24 week threshold but on more easily satisfied 
 
vi  This sets aside any other potential conflicts regarding treatment decisions. The potential models of decision-
making for ectogenic foetuses are beyond the scope of this paper. 
vii This may have implications for those pursuing human gestation but they are beyond the scope of this paper. 
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grounds.[33] The 24-week threshold was previously set at 28 weeks but was amended when 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 came into force, as a result of the 
increased survival of premature babies. Therefore, viability appears to impact the legal 
protection applied to a foetus. 
Frida Simonstein has argued that, if foetuses can be gestated independently from their 
mothers then, with the availability of ectogenesis, all foetuses will be considered viable.[34] 
As a result, all foetuses may be entitled to legal protection, thereby enhancing their legal 
status. This is likely to impact doctor’s involvement in abortion decisions as the Abortion Act 
1967 imposes a legal duty on doctors to determine whether the criteria for an abortion have 
been met.[35] Whilst it may be questionable whether this requirement is strictly adhered to in 
practice, women seeking an abortion prior to 24 weeks gestation may nevertheless find 
doctors less willing to consider the grounds satisfied if they feel that the foetus requires 
protection due to the viability that ectogenesis offers it.[36] This may further limit women’s 
autonomy in termination decisions and as a result, women may feel coerced into participating 
in partial ectogenesis if this is the only support their doctor will provide them with.  
In order to avoid women turning to backstreet abortions,[37] many academics only support 
ectogenesis if it exists alongside natural pregnancy.[38-39] Whilst this may ensure 
reproductive autonomy for some women, the co-existence of pregnancy and ectogenesis may 
prove difficult for doctors in practice. Doctors may find that they are able to provide 
treatment options to an ectogenic foetus that they cannot provide to an in vivo foetus because 
of its implications for the pregnant woman. They may therefore feel a frustration and 
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disparity in how they are treating their “patients”. In addition, since the Abortion Act 1967 
relies on limits of viability and the impact of the pregnancy on the pregnant woman, it is 
questionable how it could be applied to a request to terminate an ectogenic foetus.[40] The 
Act is therefore likely to require reform or new legislation will need to be drafted specific to 
the treatment of an ectogenic foetus. The creation of such legislation is likely to require 
lengthy consultation which may be reflective of the Warnock Committee when determining 
the status of embryos.[41] 
Liability 
The legal status of an ectogenic foetus will also impact a doctor’s liability for negligence. 
Under current legislation, the ectogenic foetus must be considered born in order to make a 
claim against the doctor. Arguments have been made for an ectogenic foetus to be treated the 
same as a new born, regardless of whether it has been partially or fully gestated 
externally,[42] whereas others have claimed that it should be treated as an entirely different 
entity.[43-44] These arguments rest on different interpretations of live birth. Alternatively, 
Eric Steiger suggests that legal status should be dependant on a developmental stage.[45] The 
merit of each of these arguments is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that current 
understandings of birth as a mark of legal personhood may result in illogical outcomes with 
ectogenesis. Doctors could owe a duty of care to foetuses who have been partially gestated in 
an artificial womb but may never owe a duty to a foetus who is fully gestated externally, 
because it has never existed within its mother.[45] Therefore, the concept of birth may 
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require revision as the legal status of an ectogenic foetus is essential to doctors understanding 
the extent of their duty of care. 
Guidance 
Whilst ectogenesis appears to lighten the conflict of duties to mother and foetus, the existence 
of both natural pregnancy and ectogenesis raises new challenges for doctors in their treatment 
of a foetus. Should ectogenesis, in any form, translate to clinical practice, clear legislation 
and guidance will be necessary for doctors to ensure that they uphold a fair and appropriate 
standard of care for all patients.  
Conclusion 
Technology has played a distinctive role in the medicalisation of pregnancy and childbirth 
and has impacted the relationship between doctors and pregnant women as well as doctor’s 
treatment of foetuses. With research paving the way to ectogenesis, pregnancy and childbirth 
may no longer be necessary in the gestation of future generations. In exploring the impact of 
ectogenesis on the medicalisation of reproduction, this paper has found that the relationship 
between doctors and intended parents may lead to further imbalance and disputes. To avoid 
this, extensive consultation and information sharing would have to take place before 
ectogenesis is utilised. Additionally, this paper indicates that whilst ectogenesis could reduce 
the conflict between the treatment of pregnant women and foetuses, it generates additional 
conflicts between doctors and their patients. If pregnancy and ectogenesis co-exist, doctors 
will need to adjust their duties accordingly and issues of abortion provision and liability for 
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negligence will remain unresolved without revised legislation. Therefore, the impact of 
ectogenesis on the issues arising from the medicalisation of reproduction can only be 
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